
















ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM, LIBERALISM  




Working Paper No.121 
  








The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Centre or 
Murdoch University. Working papers are considered draft publications for critical comments by colleagues and will generally be 
expected to be published elsewhere in a more polished form after a period of critical engagement and revision. Comments on paper(s) 
should be directed to the author(s) at K.Jayasuriya@murdoch.edu.au 
 
A revised version of this paper is published in Richard Robison (ed.) (2006) The Neoliberal Revolution: Forging the Market State, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
  
© Copyright is held by the author(s) of each working paper: No part of this publication may be republished, reprinted or reproduced 






National Library of Australia. 
ISSN: 1037-4612 
 
INTRODUCTION: ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE NEW 
WELFARE GOVERNANCE 1 
At the beginning of the twenty first century the neo liberal market model that so dominated 
economic and social policy making during the later decades of the last century appears to be 
under increasing challenge. This arises not only from the anti globalisation movements (e.g., 
the World Social Forum), but also from the populist politics of elected governments in the 
newly industrialising countries. For example, in Latin America, the election of leaders such as 
Lula Da Silva of the Brazilian Workers Party, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, and Hugo 
Chavez in Venezuela, has it seemed bucked some of the main tenets of the ‘Washington 
consensus’. In East Asia too the election of Thaksin Shinawatra on election platform that 
championed Thai nationalism against the austerity policies advocated by the IMF suggest that 
even on the home turf of the Washington consensus, the ‘miracle’ economies of East Asian 
neo liberal economic policies that so dominated the 1990s are facing mounting pressures. 
Compounding these trends has been the development of a raft of policies and programs that 
focus on issues such a poverty reduction and social safety nets1 promoted by International 
Financial Institutions (IFI), and especially the World Bank, have developed These 
developments would seem to clearly document a growing concern with and awareness of the 
social dimensions of economic development that were absent in the era of the hard edged neo 
liberalism of the Washington Consensus. But to see this new welfare governance as a part of 
movement back from economic to social policy is to miss the fact that this new policy 
strategy seeks to entrench a form  of ‘market citizenship’ that differs from that reflected in  
the political grammar of post war social democracy.  
This chapter explores the nature and dimension of this emerging policy framework, 
particularly in its relationship to the neo liberal market model. As we shall argue, the social 
policies underlying this framework arises out of, but not reducible to, neo liberalism. This 
viewpoint pivots on the break between the post war social settlement in industrial 
democracies reflected – albeit in different ways – as a notion of welfare seen as a means of 
compensation or redistribution to redress the operation of market forces. These notions of 
welfare, however, are being overtaken in the shift from what I have previously described as 
‘social constitutionalism’ to a form of ‘economic constitutionalism’. (Jayasuriya 2005, 2001, 
                                                 
1  This is a revised version of  paper presented at a conference organized by Richard Robison  
at the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague. The conference was entitled Neo liberalism 
after Three Decades: The End of an Epoch or a New Mutation.  
 
1999). This new constitutional order is not confined merely to formal legal practices, but also 
pertains to the broader set of state-society relations as well as the guiding normative principles 
of the political order. Importantly, this re-orientation to a new form of constitutionalism 
privileges the pursuit of economic and market order which fosters a notion of welfare as 
market citizenship. The crux of the argument being advanced here: is that social policy still 
plays a crucial role in these new forms of economic constitutionalism, but it is designed and 
shaped so as to enhance inclusion within the market rather than being preoccupied with the 
earlier emphasis on notions such as the redistribution of income.  
One of the consequences of this location of welfare and social policy within the market is 
to reinforce a new language of liberalism that contrasts with the conflict and negotiation and 
mediation of  negotiation of social interests within post war social constitutionalism. There is 
here a crucial shift in the language of liberalism away from political pluralism and towards the 
regulation and imposition of standards that are congruent with the larger objectives of the 
economic order. In the Introduction to this volume, Robison suggests that neo liberalism is a 
process that leads to the marginalization of representative politics. This chapter explores the 
language of liberalism associated with the new welfare governance. A governance that 
articulates liberalism that seeks to create New Liberal subjects and institutions whose purpose 
and ends are shaped by economic imperatives that are seen to be inimical to pluralist politics 
of interest.  
Framed in these terms the policies and programs instituted by the political leaders drawn 
from countries such as Brazil (Lula) or Thailand (Thaksin) represent a kind of ‘third way’ 
politics that bears comparison with the policies of New Labour in the UK. Like New Labour 
it could be argued that both Brazil and Thailand reflect a move that attempts to reconcile 
fidelity to market imperatives with policies dealing with issues of social disadvantage. In fact, 
in Brazil, Cardoso,2 and subsequently, Lula, have been active participants in the third way 
progressive governance conferences. The enrolment of Lula in the third way enterprise is 
noteworthy because Lula’s Workers Party was cast very much in the mould of a traditional 
socialist party. What this would appear to indicate is that Lula’s program is in many ways a 
continuation of Cardoso’s policies and programs.   
These trends have led some to fear, and others to hope, that the neo liberal market model 
may be on the wane. Although both responses contain a kernel of truth they can at the same 
time be misleading. Its plausibility lies in that it highlights the way that the market model or 
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neo liberalism is being modified; but it is misleading in the assumption that this modification 
itself reflects a significant departure from the basic neo liberal economic re-ordering that has 
been undertaken in Latin America and East Asia. What is intriguing is that this emerging 
model denotes a continuing commitment to economic liberalization but with a strong 
emphasis on a whole new set of social contracts between the citizenry and the state. 
What these new social forms and arrangements promoted in countries such as Brazil and 
Thailand, and also by the World Bank, through its new social policy agenda it to point to a 
neo liberal sociability which may be understood as a ‘socialization of neo liberalism’. This 
understanding of sociability frames social issues or the ‘social question’ not in the language of 
social democracy, but in economic constitutionalism in a manner that makes it compatible 
with market efficiency. Hence, insofar as this brings back the ‘social’ it seeks to reframe the 
social or economic problems, within, rather than in, opposition or in contestation to the 
market. And crucially it rejects the social democratic argument central to ‘social citizenship 
namely that market if left unhindered will produce inequalities of income which can only 
rectified through public intervention. The expectation is that these new social policies will in 
the long term, work to include citizens within the sphere of the market rather than seeking 
to—as in the more orthodox models of welfare—insure against the vagaries of market 
misfortunes. Moving away from the conventional insurance model of welfare towards a more 
inclusive model constitutes an understanding of citizenship’ very different from that contained 
in the Marshallian sense of citizenship and welfare (Marshall 1964). By contrast, economic 
constitutionalism promotes an inclusive or a productivist version of welfare where issues of 
poverty and inequality are ‘identified with individual trajectories of social exclusion and the 
idea of shared social risk as the basis for organising solidarity is rejected’ (Procacci 2001: 51). 
What is, therefore, so distinctive about these social contracts is the development of a market 
citizenship which above all is consistent with neo liberal projects of economic reform. Neo 
liberalism then on this view is more than a set of economic prescriptions but is increasingly 
about the creation of new forms of sociability that promote enterprising subjects and values.  
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MARKET CITIZENSHIP, WELFARE, AND ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM  
Therefore, the argument here is not so much about the shift of expenditure or the retreat from 
the welfare state, but a fundamental reformulation of the idea of welfare. Much of the 
literature on the welfare state has remained exclusively concerned with distinguishing regimes 
and patterns of welfare to the exclusion of any normative practices that came to be embodied 
in welfare policy programs and policies (Esping-Anderson 1990). As Pinker (1977) notes in 
his prescient book written just before the Thatcher era, there have always been competing 
traditions or ideas of welfare and these ideas in turn have reflected different understandings of 
the relationship between the market and the welfare. In fact Pinker (1979) draws pointed 
attention to—and implicitly advocates—the varying currents of what Levitas (1996, 1998) has 
elsewhere called a ‘social integrationist’ model of social policy. The integrationist model 
envisages a different relationship between market and social policy from that implied in the 
then dominant social democratic framework of social policy. Thus, Pinker advocates what he 
calls a model of welfare ‘which sees no fundamental incompatibility between the 
enhancement of social welfare and the values of the mixed economy and pluralist social 
order’ (Pinker 1979: 241).  
In tracing this productivist tradition in Britain to both Keynes and Beveridge3, Pinker 
implicitly appears to be contrasting this with what Titmuss’s (1974) notion of the welfare 
state as an ‘institutional redistributive model’. In fact, during the last decade this social 
integrationist perspective has become much more influential as evidenced in the growing 
popularity of terms such as ‘social exclusion’ and ‘social capital’. Welfare, as the thrust of 
Pinker’s argument suggests, is by no means a static concept. Significantly, he draws attention 
to the fact that competing forms of welfarism represent a version of a preferred model of 
social association and a relationship with the market. The implication of what Pinker is 
suggesting is that citizenship, or rather the normative grounding of citizenship—seen as the 
decisive link between welfare and the market—has always been historically variable. This is 
no less true for the post war model of social citizenship so well articulated by Marshall.  
But ‘ideas of welfare’ are not a free floating set of traditions that can be picked off at 
one’s fancy. Rather, they remain tied to various political projects of citizenship and statecraft 
and the real question is: how and why are certain ideas of welfare replaced by others. Market 
citizenship carries with it a distinctive model of welfare that fundamentally changes the 
relationship between welfare and the market. And it is this shift towards ‘market citizenship’ 
which makes the new social policy a political project that is more than a simple amalgam of 
 4
public policies. It also entails changes in the patterns and routines of statecraft as well as 
providing a distinctive model of social organisation and association that is less based on class 
relations and more focused on access to and participation within the economic sphere 
Hence Citizenship, or rather the changing regimes of citizenship, lies at the heart of new 
frameworks of social policy. Citizenship, we know, can be defined either as a status or a 
practice; as a status, citizenship is defined by its legal attributes and conditions of access to 
various entitlements; as a practice it is constituted through the way it is exercised by 
individuals in various social and political domains. In reality, any citizenship regime will be a 
combination of both ‘legal status’ and political practice, and as Lister argues 
Citizenship is thus conceptualized here both as a status, carrying a wide range of rights, and as a 
practice, involving both obligations and political participation, broadly defined. Both as a 
practice and in the relationship between that practice and rights, citizenship can be understood 
as a dynamic process (Lister 1997: 41).  
Lister’s insight here about citizenship as a dynamic process provides us with the starting point 
for an understanding of citizenship being fundamentally a political process that reshapes state 
practices and institutions. And it is market citizenship that lies at the heart of the new welfare 
governance.  
White (2004), in formulating his own version of asset-based welfare, points out that 
there are various strands of economic citizenship ranging from the libertarian to the new 
workfare programs of the US. White is keen to distinguish between some of these market 
strands of economic citizenship from the susbstance of what, in his view, are potentially 
progressive policies such as widening asset ownership within the community. White is right 
to point out the range of positions that can be found within the framework of economic 
citizenship, but the problem with this argument is that it fails to identify what links together 
these various notions of economic or market citizenship. We can identify five fundamental 
elements that link market citizenship. These are:  
i. citizenship is framed within the market rather than in opposition to or in compensation 
from consequences of the market ;  
ii. social policy within the market citizenship is designed so as to make a productive 
contribution or enhance greater participation within the economy; 
iii. participation is individualised in terms of the ability to mobilise individual 
endowments of capacities and assets 
iv. social policy moves from a rights based to a contractual version of welfare that makes 
social policy claims conditional on the performance of specified obligations or duties; 
and, 
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v. market citizenship tends to define social association in terms of access to, and 
participation within, the market. 
In this sense ‘third way’ programs of all shapes and hues can be considered as programs that 
give effect to forms of market citizenship. Instead of being in tension with the market, key 
ideas such as equality and redistribution have become reframed in a way that promotes 
inclusion within the productive sphere of the economy. Most crucially, in third way programs 
such as that in New Labour in the UK, equality is understood as an ‘equality of opportunity’ 
where fairness is assessed in terms of participation within the market. It is a formulation that 
moves equality—as an issue of the redistribution of income—to a notion of equality as 
inclusion and participation within the market economy (Cammack 2004).  
These third way ideas, therefore, resonate with those traditions of welfare that seeks to 
combine welfare with a productive market economy. Importantly, this goes well beyond the 
specifics of the third way program to encompass a whole range of policy agendas such the 
World Bank’s ‘social capital’ approach or the European Union’s ‘social inclusion’ policy. The 
common thread running through these otherwise different conceptions is a reworking of the 
‘social question’ as one bearing market citizenship rather than social citizenship. 
What this implies, as Rosanavallon notes, is that ‘in both cases the philosophical crisis of 
the welfare state indicates a decisive change in the perception of society that has prevailed for 
more than a century’ (Rosanvallon 2000: 5). Rosanvallon, like Giddens, looks upon this 
transformation as driven by a new form of modernization that works to undermine the 
assumption around which the modern welfare state was built and consolidated. New form of 
economic complexity and risk it is argued demand that social policy be directed at furthering 
the risk management capacities of individuals. Arguing along these lines the new social policy 
frameworks seek to place a high premium on the identification and prudential management of 
risk... 
Casting these new social policy frameworks as the products of an inexorable process of 
modernisation is limited in that it obscures the political context in which these new 
frameworks now thrive. What is overlooked here is the fact that what we call the social 
democratic logic of the social question rested on a particular political grammar around which 
issues of equality and welfare were framed. As we have argued, what is significant about the 
new social question being posed by variants of the third way is the manner in which they 
enable or embed market processes within the social process. The new welfare governance 
seeks to develop those capacities and endowments of individuals that will enable them to 
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compete more effectively in the productive mainstream of society. The Workfare programs 
which have characterised Anglo-American social policy over the last decade demonstrates a 
vivid example of this mode of thinking. (Walters 1997). 
LINKING MARKETS TO WELFARE 
Central to our argument is that this shift from social to market citizenship is expressive of a 
deeper transformation in the liberal order. Social citizenship was organised around the 
negotiation and conflict of interest which originated in the dualism between market and the 
social sphere. In contrast market citizenship reflects a more anti pluralist understanding of 
politics that seeks to subordinate social policy to market imperatives. It marginalises those 
social relations that arise in conflict with the market in favour of modes of social association 
based on access to, and participation within, the market. Consequently, notions such as social 
capital and community have come to replace class and social conflict; and importantly, this 
reflects a deeper transformation in the language of liberalism towards inculcation of certain 
standard of behaviour or values rather mediation and negotiation of social conflict. We 
explore two earlier liberal traditions – the ordo-liberals and the New Liberalism – as a way of 
putting some flesh on the liberal language of market citizenship.  
At the core of this new market citizenship and the welfare governance are two key liberal 
concepts of welfare: one is the idea of ‘inclusion’ of all citizens within the economic 
mainstream, and the other is that of economic independence to enable individuals to compete 
more effectively within a globalised market economy. But this language of liberalism, I argue, 
moves away from the politics or pluralism of social interests— sustained by the competing 
ontologies of the market and social solidarity—towards a liberalism that is increasingly anti 
political. The new welfare governance therefore needs to be understood in terms of this more 
fundamental reconstitution of the language of a pluralist liberalism. Social contracts then, 
somewhat surprisingly, become the leading edge through which these New Liberal subjects 
are being created.  
The notion of inclusion occupies a key role in the justification for welfare couched in 
terms of including individuals in the mainstream of social and economic life, and finds 
expression in those policies designed to promote a social market economy. An important 
precursor to this understanding of the social within regulatory neo liberalism can be found 
within the ordo-liberal tradition that seeks to marry a strong state with a commitment to 
maintaining economic order within a competitive market economy. In particular, as I have 
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argued elsewhere (Jayasuriya 1999, 2000), this is consistent with an understanding of 
economic and social intervention as a way of ‘constitutionalising economic processes. 
Economic constitutionalism refers to the attempt to treat the market as a constitutional order 
with its own rules, procedures, and institutions operating to protect the market order from 
political interference. These liberal threads are examined through an exploration of the social 
market traditions of ordo-liberalism especially, the argument that social conduct needs to be 
market conforming.   
The other notion that drives new welfare governance is desire to improve the economic 
independence of individuals by enhancing the asset holdings of the poor and the socially 
disadvantaged. In this particular strand of the new welfare governance greater inclusion 
within the economic mainstream is to be accomplished through policies that enhance the 
capacities and endowment of individuals to compete within a globalised economy. These 
ideas are explored through an analysis of the British New Liberal tradition whose members 
include such theorists such as Hobhouse and Hobson. These ideas are similar to the economic 
constitutionalism of the ordo-liberals in that it locates welfare within the ontology of the 
market order. But in these versions liberal subjects are located within a moralized or ‘ethical’ 
market economy. 
Ordo-liberalism, social market and market conforming conduct  
The driving idea of the ordo-liberal tradition is that the construction of economic order cannot 
be left to the spontaneous actions of the market, and needs to be created through a consistent 
order-based policy (ordnungspolitik) of the state (Peacock & Willgerodt 1989). For the ordo-
liberals the ‘various economic, political, legal, and other social processes are interrelated. 
Each act of government intervention must therefore be seen in connection with the total 
processes and overall economic order so as to ensure the ‘system conformity of measures’ 
(Petersmann 1991: 63). Accordingly, the state should not attempt to conduct the economy; 
rather, it should provide a system of juridical institutions that would facilitate the construction 
of the market.  
Hence the central characteristic of this ‘economic constitutionalism’ is the attempt to 
insulate social and economic institutions from the assumed debilitating effects of political 
bargaining (Jayasuriya 1999; 2001), so much so that the 
economic constitution distinguishes between those actions that are consistent with the economic 
freedom-based logic of that choice and those that are not. The former represents “conforming” 
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conduct; the latter is politically based regulatory discretion. Economic constitutionalism thus 
represents a cognitive map or template for evaluating governmental action (Gerber 1994: 17).  
But the point here is that this economic constitutionalism, as Gerber observes, encompasses 
much more than a shift towards a rule-based rather discretionary economic policy; it is 
equally concerned with enabling ‘conforming conduct’ within the sphere of civil society. 
From this perspective, economic constitutionalism seeks to institute processes and structures 
of governance that activate modes of conduct appropriate to a competitive market economy. 
Running through the ordo-liberal movement, it is possible to discern a distinctive 
political dimension to economic constitutionalism. In essence the ordo-liberals develop a 
political conception of market order where institutions are designed to protect it from the 
corrosive influence of politics; it is a politics of anti politics. Those concerned about the anti 
competitive effects of society on the economy such as Eucken (1950) argued that by the end 
of the 19th century the state was increasingly captured by private interest groups leading to the 
politicisation of the economy, which in turn, weakened the state. Economic constitutionalism 
was not merely designed to protect ‘economic institutions of the market from ‘political 
interference’, but also to facilitate the creation of the kinds of social order that is consistent 
with the market economy. What is crucial here is the fact that the purpose of the state is 
defined in terms of pursuing the ends of economic order that is articulated within a language 
of liberalism that is itself is counterpoised to the pluralism of social interests.   
The economic constitutionalism of the kind promoted here has two important features: 
first, it sees markets as a product of state or political intervention; in this view properly 
functioning and effective markets require systematic state intervention. This view of state 
intervention is a significant departure form those public choice conceptions of state 
intervention—so influential in the early development of neo liberalism—that reduces any 
form of state intervention in the market place to unhealthy predatory impulses. The ordo-
liberal tradition of capitalism was conceptualized as a system that was intrinsically juridical in 
form and therefore government or statecraft in our terminology must seek to consciously 
provide economic order and security4 (Lemke 2001). The difference here is that for the ordo-
liberals a strong state is essential for the protection and furthering of the market forms. To use 
Oakshott’s (1975) terminology, the state becomes an enterprise association whose purpose it 
is to promote economic order.  
But economic order goes beyond the governance of economic institutions; it also seeks 
to regulate those elements in society that are deemed to be uncompetitive. For the ordo-
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liberals, society itself can become an obstacle to an efficient and competitive market, so much 
so that it becomes an object of governance, particularly to those economic institutions that are 
considered vital for maintenance of economic order. Economic constitutionalism as envisaged 
in ordo-liberal accounts encompasses much more than a move towards a rule-based economic 
policy; it is equally concerned with enabling ‘conforming conduct’ within the sphere of civil 
society. What this amounts to is that social order is inextricably tied to the reproduction of 
economic order. Programs that seek to maintain economic order then must seek to institute 
processes and structures of governance that activate modes of entrepreneurial conduct 
appropriate to an efficient market economy. Not only does the state become an ‘enterprise 
association’ but society itself is seen as a site that can further entrepreneurial forms of action.  
However we need to bear mind that this justified state intervention only to the extent that 
it promoted and furthered market and economic order. As a result, various innovative 
institutional schemes to enable greater individual participation within the economic sphere 
become tethered to a broader pattern of economic constitutionalism. Accordingly, social 
policy becomes an integral element in the management of an efficient economic program. 
What is critical here is that social policy was directed towards ‘lessening the anti-social 
consequences of competition, it had to block the anti-competitive mechanisms which society 
can spawn’ (Lemke 2001: 195). Welfare within this tradition of economic constitutionalism 
was not compensatory but was perceived largely as an instrument of economic reform to 
create a more competitive and entrepreneurial forms of conduct within social institutions.  
These notions of economic and social order that came to be embodied in the notion of 
the social market economy formed an important aspect of ordo-liberal thinking. Importantly, 
for our purposes what this does is to point towards a neo liberal version of welfare that can be 
clearly distinguished from earlier formulations of social citizenship, and justifies state 
intervention in the social realm only to the extent that it promotes those entrepreneurial forms 
that considered to be vital for the effective functioning of the market economy. The economy 
and society, though seen as separate realms, only serve to reinforce the fundamentals of the 
economic order of society; hence social intervention can be justified if it has a substantial 
impact on the reproduction of economic order.  
The origin of the term the ‘social market economy’ is to be found in the work of Alfred 
Muller-Armack (1966) who was associated with Freiburg school.5 His contribution to ordo-
liberalism was to expand the legalistic focus of the ordo-liberal program to encompass a range 
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of social measures that were thought to be essential to the maintenance of economic order. 
Not surprisingly, some of these social market ideas proved to be an especially important 
element in the formation of the post war German economy. As Joerges and Rödl  point out: 
The political function of the term “social market economy’ was basically to present an 
alternative to the socialist or at least interventionist (“mixed economy”) spirit of the era 
dominating public opinion and the conforming to the practical predominance of planning 
elements in Germany’s economy during the occupation period. (Joerges and Rödl  2004: 15)  
But what is a social market economy? Muller–Armack discussed a number of ways in which 
market and societal spheres mutually reinforced each other (Joerges and Rödl  2004). The first 
way was through the mutually beneficial social effects of the market through lower prices or 
the range of products available in the market. However societal intervention was justified to 
the extent that it performed two functions which we might call an order and legitimacy 
function. Muller-Armack (1966) argues for those policies such as full employment which 
serve to maintain whatever social order that was considered essential to market order. But 
more interesting was his expansion of the notion of the social market economy. It was seen as 
an  
 … understanding of societal problems underlay his concerns with about the stable pertinence of 
liberal society under – as he perceived them- ‘modern’ conditions. The most threatening factors 
were ‘mass society’ as a whole and its general tendency towards proletarinisation, as well as 
specific institutions of mass society, namely large business concerns and mass organization 
(Joerges and Rödl  2004: 17). 
However, considering that in the social market model, societal institutions were seen as being 
subordinate to the demands of economic order, did not necessarily rule out extensive 
intervention in the social sphere. Rather, it implicitly embodied the ‘anti pluralist’ liberalism 
of economic constitutionalism by seeking to mould societal interest to the values of the 
market order. In fact, the very pluralism of politics was seen to be a potential source of anti 
competitive values and behaviour. Therefore social interests and conflict were seen to be 
fundamentally at odds with the institutions of economic order (Joerges & Ridel 2004). In this 
sense, the social market economy, at least as conceptualised by the ordo-liberals, has 
markedly anti pluralist and authoritarian elements. Market citizenship embodies some of these 
anti pluralist elements and it is in this language of liberalism that we can identify a major 
dividing line between the new welfare governance and the social constitutionalism of the post 
war period.  
From this vantage the different formulations of the third way can be seen as constituting 
the basis for a new framework of the social question. This is one that seeks to justify public 
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intervention in the social order in terms of the imperative of the market order itself. Pivotal to 
this approach to social policy is the ‘legitimacy function’ that Muller-Armack identified with 
the social market economy. Of course, the kinds of legitimacy issues that he faced in post war 
Germany were quite different from those faced by present day neo liberal modes of statecraft 
such as those associated with the third way. Third way programs are more likely to seek to 
focus on issues of legitimacy through the active promotion of entrepreneurial forms of action 
and institutions. Similarly many transnational social policy programs—such as social funds 
and micro credit policies—are directed towards the promotion of legitimacy through 
entrepreneurial activity. This is a point well made in Weber’s (2001) perceptive paper on the 
global development architecture and micro credit strategies where he analyses the role of 
social safety as mechanisms of political crisis management. Therefore, building on such 
notions such as social capital or community empowerment, social programs have had the 
effect of turning unemployment from a social issue or a social problem to one of ‘social 
conduct’ while at the same time dealing with the issues of legitimacy created by policies of 
market reform. 
A further striking convergence between the ordo-liberals and this newsocial policy ethos 
is that that both tend to exemplify a kind of institutionalism that tends to view the capitalist 
economy not as a set of social relations but as an ensemble of institutions.6 In this way, social 
institutions, and by implication the welfare system is shaped by the imperatives of capitalist 
economic order. But this social policy orientation and statecraft such as those associated with 
the third way are similarly directed at enabling those institutional forms of capitalism that are 
thought to be essential for the reproduction of market order. Clearly, the new welfare 
governance places great store on developing partnerships between civil society and the state 
in the pursuance of various social projects. So for example, the poverty reduction strategy of 
the World Bank seeks to further what it calls pro poor strategies by encouraging individuals 
and groups to participate in the formulation of social policies strategies and programs. 
Similarly, Bevir notes that many of the policies of the New Labour in the UK seek to 
implement a broad range of governance programs would seem to assume an institutionalist 
understanding of networks and partnerships to activate ‘stable relationships characterized by 
trust, social participation, voluntary associations, and friendship, at least as much as from 
markets and competition’ (Bevir 2003: 459). But what is missing in Bevir account is that this 
new governance privileges certain forms of social association and community primarily by 
marginalising the conflicts of class and social relations and serves to reinforce the anti 
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pluralism of economic constitutionalism. And to the extent that it succeeds in this form of 
statecraft it manages to depoliticize social and economic governance.  
New Liberalism, property and liberal subjects  
Whereas ordo-liberals seek to link markets and welfare by creating and strengthening social 
institutions to reflect market priorities, an earlier British tradition of New Liberalism 
associated with theorists such as Hobhouse7 (Hobhouse 1922), T H Green, and John Hobson 
sought to elaborate a utilitarian justification for welfare and economic efficiency. This theorist 
writing at the turn of the 20th century sought to reconcile classical liberal ideas of 
individualism and economic freedom with mounting social problems of unemployment and 
poverty resulting from rapid industrialization. And they did this by developing notions of 
welfarism that was compatible with economic efficiency. Hobhouse in particular argued that 
public policy should be directed at removing those obstacles to individual self reliance. He 
recognised that this justifies public intervention only insofar as it was deemed to be crucial for 
the operation of an efficient and legitimate market system. This justification of a role for 
government in protecting and securing what might be called the social requisites of the market 
economy was mainly made on the grounds that this would lead to higher levels of overall 
civic welfare.  
In this regard crucial for the New Liberals was broadening the ownership of property 
within community. Hence the ‘right of an individual to hold property was an expression of his 
membership in the community and its justification was to be found in welfare and will of the 
community’ (Freeden 1978: 220). Property ownership was an essential component of a liberal 
society, as theorists, such as Green, Hobhouse, Bosanquet, and Hobson argued, it permitted 
citizens to become full members of a liberal community. In other words, as Morrow (2001) 
notes, the assumption was that liberal subjects could exercise their full moral capacities only 
through the ownership of property. Unlike the libertarian notions, these ideas of property 
rights sought to emphasise the way possession of property was constitutive of liberal subjects 
with a stake in the community. For Hobhouse:  
property is the common basis of the freedom and self dependence, the possession of some 
property is desirable for individuals and, and for any corporate body that has to direct its own 
affairs (Hobhouse 1922: 155).  
Property rights then—unlike for the libertarians—was a means towards creating the moral 
capacities of liberal individuals. One of the consequences of this was that New Liberals such 
as Hobhouse and Hobson were willing to justify an expansive range of intervention strategies 
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‘for systems of state regulation that fostered efficiency, and promoted justice by ensuring that 
all members of population were able to posses the amount and type of property necessary for 
full membership of the community’ (Morrow 2001: 108). What distinguishes this early 
twentieth century understanding of market citizenship is the way it relates the exercise of 
liberal capacities to the possession of a share in the productive economy. New Liberalism 
transformed the notion of poverty from material ‘misery and insufficient spending-power and 
into the realm of the negation of human status, participation, self control and opportunity’ 
(Freeden 2004: 77). In this way the New Liberalism articulates a notion of market citizenship 
and welfare whose main elements sit at odds with the post war social citizenship that is 
premised on redressing the inequalities produced by the market.  
The relevance of New Liberal arguments for market citizenship lies in the fact that the 
New Liberals sought, as Vincent (2001) observes, to combine both an ethical understanding 
of rights with a commitment to the liberal market... Property for these theorists had a strong 
ethical component in that it provided an instrument for creating liberal subjects with the 
ethical capacities to contribute to the common good. In this way New Liberalism transformed 
the notion of poverty from material ‘misery and insufficient spending-power and into the 
realm of the negation of human status, participation, self control and opportunity’ (Freeden 
2004: 77). Social intervention was then directed at producing these self reliant and 
economically independent individuals, but was to be found within the realms of an ethical 
market order. What this view has in common with third way ideologies is the marriage of 
communitarianism with market ontology but this marriage is only possible by locating 
citizenship within the realms of an ethical market order. And this comes at the cost of 
displacing those competing social interests within the market that underpinned the pluralist 
politics of social constitutionalism. New Liberalism and the contemporary welfare governance 
converge around a language of liberalism that is hostile to the pluralism of social interests 
within the market economy.  
These ethical imperatives were equally evident in the way the New Liberals sought to 
link market citizenship and welfare by grounding social rights in the form of reciprocal 
obligations. As Freeden (1978) notes, for the New Liberals rights were 
a benefit conferred by society for mutual advantage of the recipient and the conceder. What they 
were not prepared to accept was the idea of an unconditional right, irrespective of whether it 
was feasible or merited- which was what a absolute right is (Freeden 1978: 219).  
Economic constitutionalism in all its various modern incarnations is characterised by this 
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valorisation of social integration through policies that enhance participation and stakeholding 
in the economic sphere and the individual liability for reciprocal obligation in return for social 
claims on the state.  
An echo of this New Liberal emphasis on broadening participation within the market can 
be found in programs for social inclusion (which belong to the social market category)as well 
as in other programs designed to enhance endowment of individual assets—be it income, 
training or social capital—and also active participation within the market. Whereas social 
citizenship of the post war period was directed towards income replacement these market 
citizenship policies are directed towards strengthening individual assets in order to compete 
within a market economy. It follows that in contrast to social citizenship this view of 
citizenship not only decommodifies welfare—that is social policy is individualised—but 
market imperatives are at the heart of the justification for welfare helping to create New 
Liberal subjects.  
In this way recent social policy initiatives have turned towards the development of assets 
based social policies as an ‘integral part of an overall development strategy that seeks to raise 
incomes and standards of living for all’ (Midgley 2003: 10). This attempt to situate asset 
based policies within a framework of ‘developmentalism’ strongly echoes the New Liberal 
justification of welfare in term of greater economic independence. It points to the way in 
which citizenship is defined within the capitalist market economy and in such a way that it 
precludes the pluralism of interests so vital to social constitutionalism.  
Arguing along these lines, one of the main objectives of these assets based policies is the 
broadening of asset ownership in the economic sphere. For example, Singapore Central 
Provident Fund (CPF)—a retirement insurance scheme—allows for individual accounts for 
health, education, and specified investments (Sherraden 1997 and Low and Choon 2004). The 
CPF model, it will be recalled, had quite an influential bearing on early third way thinking on 
stakeholder economy.  
More recently the asset based ideas have been expressed through the concept of 
individual development accounts for whole range welfare and education needs. Be they 
stakeholding or individual development accounts, these asset based programs seek to 
individualise welfare in a way that contrasts sharply with the collectivist insurance model of 
the post war welfare state. Equally illustrative of these property based policies in developing 
countries in the NICS such as Thailand are the so called ‘asset conversion programs’ that 
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encourage poor farmers or the urban poor without property rights to convert their assets into 
legal title (Jayasuriya and Hewison 2004). The assumption here is that the individuals will 
then be able to convert these property rights into an asset which can be used to more actively 
participate in the economy.  
New Liberalism—as with the ordo-liberals—allows us to examine the normative 
foundations of market citizenship and welfare by underlining how the new social contracts, by 
seeking to inculcate individual self reliance and responsibility, attempt to create New Liberal 
subjects. Individual self reliance and economic independence—which was especially 
important in enhancing community membership—was to be achieved through the ownership 
and possession of property. It is the possession of property that serves to bind liberal subjects 
to the broader community and the common good. But this ideological hybrid of 
communitarianism and markets is only possible by locating liberal subjects within—as with 
the New Liberalism—a ‘ethical’ market economy. But this moralised economy diminishes the 
contestation of politics in favour of anti political liberalism.   
 
CONCLUSION – ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ANTI PLURALISTIC 
LIBERALISM  
Welfare, for both the New Liberals and the ordo-liberals alike was framed within the market; 
the bond between welfare and market order is clearly a defining feature of forms of market 
citizenship in economic constitutionalism. And the common thread that links both the ordo-
liberals and the New Liberals is the fact that both seek to create liberal subjects whose 
capacities and purposes are shaped by the productive economy. In turn an efficient market 
economy depends on the creation of these liberal subjects. For the ordo-liberals, these such 
‘liberal subjects’ were created through creating societal institutions that would enchance the 
entrepreneurial capacities of individuals as well as furnishing the foundations for legitimate 
market order. For the New liberals such as Hobhouse the possession of property was a means 
of creating self reliant individuals who would have a stake in the community. Both forms of 
liberalism have this in common with contemporary forms of welfare governance: they seek to 
create liberal subjects who are ethically embedded in the productive sphere of the economy. 
This is not to say there are important differences. For, Hobhouse and for other New Liberals 
like the T. H. Green, market order was just one purpose of public action. On the other hand, 
what is distinctive about the ordo-liberals—which creates a striking affinity between them and 
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the new policy frameworks—is the overwhelming importance attached to the pursuit of 
market order.  
An equally important theme that runs through these liberal traditions of market 
citizenship is a conception of welfare as a component of a well ordered and efficient market 
system. But the point at issue for both the New Liberals and the ordo-liberals is not social 
intervention par se but the type and form of intervention. Understanding welfare in this way 
—unlike early forms of neo liberalism—makes a ‘strong state’ an important dimension of a 
properly functioning market system. Hence there has been a proliferation of programs and 
policies of welfare governance—the new social policy ethos—that have sought to reshape the 
relationship between state and citizen in order to foster forms of market citizenship. These 
social entitlements may be quite generous and expansive. But that is not the point. What 
matters is the fact that these entitlements are justified in terms of their capacity to enable 
greater participation of individuals within the economic mainstream.   
Market citizenship whether formulated in terms of the social market economy, the New 
Liberal idea of community, the World Bank, or the EU, focus on social inclusion, justifies 
welfarism in terms of its capacity to create an inclusive society that places a high value 
economic participation. This differs from the idea of welfare as compensation or 
redistribution that was such an influential element of the social democratic ‘grammar’ of 
politics that defined the post war welfare state. This shift from an insurance paradigm—the 
collective indemnification of the risks of the market economy—to an understanding of social 
policy, and more broadly, the social sphere, as the furthering or reinforcing of an inclusive 
and participatory market economy constitutes a significant transformation in the very 
language of liberalism .    
But its most significant consequence is that social institutions and their governance are 
depoliticised  in a way that limits the conflict and negotiation of social interests that formed 
such a crucial element of social constitutionalism. Sustaining this social constitutionalism was 
the politics of negotiation and conflict of social interests that in turn hinged on the dualism 
between the market and the social sphere. Welfare was at the heart of this often conflictual 
and contradictory logic of the market and social solidarity. But it is this politics of social 
conflict, or more broadly, a politics of interest that is absent in the new economic 
constitutionalism that has come to dominate both the industrialized and newly industrializing 
countries.  
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By reshaping welfare along productivist lines the new welfare governance creates liberal 
subjects who are defined not on the basis of membership of interest or class communities but 
in terms of the possession and attributes of those endowments or capacities to participate and 
compete within the productive sphere of the economy. Moreover, the new welfare governance 
as well as the broader governance structure in which these policy alternatives take shape, 
embody a particular conception of politics as one of management and consensus. This serves 
to reinforce an anti pluralist strand of liberalism that is at the core of the new market 
citizenship  
Neo liberalism, cannot be reduced to a set of policy prescriptions for economic 
liberalization and deregulation. In fact, as programs of market reform were confronted with 
major challenges noticeable in an appreciable shift in thinking away from a predatory view of 
the state that characterized the initial move towards projects of neo liberal reform in US and 
the UK as well as World Bank structural adjustment programs. The more recent neo liberal 
programs, we argue, are more focused on developing new forms and practices of social and 
economic regulation. These new regulatory practices call for a more interventionist and 
activist state that would enable those forms of social conduct that promote market norms and 
practices.  
Hence neo liberalism is transformed into a political project that seeks to regulate the 
social in a way that is compatible with the market. Not surprisingly, the rationale of the social 
policy agenda currently promoted aims not at pushing back the state but rather at achieving 
some measure of internal transformation within the state. In this respect, neo liberalism, as 
Peck and Tickell (2002) have suggested, needs to be as an ongoing process of economic and 
political change. They propose a useful dividing line between what they call ‘rollback’ and 
‘rollout’ neo liberalism. ‘Rollback’ neo liberalism represents the early deregulationist thrust 
of Thatcher and Regan, while ‘rollout’ neo liberalism represents a new surge in the re-
regulation of newly deregulated markets. The relevant point here is not that state intervention 
diminishes or is less marginal, but that this new economic constitutionalism is framed within 
a new language of liberalism that is inimical to the pluralist politics of interest that 




                                                                                                                                                        
NOTES 
1. For an analysis of these ideas in the context of the development of a new post Washington 
Consensus See Rosser and Jayasuriya (2001).  
2. Cardoso of course is a sociologist by training who was leader of the schools of dependent 
development. While some have suggested that he has broken with the dependency tradition it 
should be noted that he likes to situate his project in terms of a broader modernization strategy. At 
least on this score he has some continuities with his earlier dependency work (see Powers 2001)  
3. Though curiously he leaves out the tradition of new liberalism in shaping the integrationist 
welfare tradition. 
4. This was noted as Lemke notes by Foucault in his famous College de France lectures in 1979 
(Lemke 2001; Burchell et al. 1991) 
5. Though Joerges and Rödl (2004) point out that he was not in the inner circles of the Freiburg 
school; his chair was Cologne. 
6. As Lemke points out: ‘The historical significance of this hypothesis is that it rejects a concept of 
history that attempts to derive socio-political changes from the economic transformation processes 
of capitalism’ (Lemke 2001: 194). 
7. See White (2004) on Hobhouse and asset based social policy .  
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